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ABSTRACT 
 
Gisser and Sánchez (1980a) state the conditions under which welfare gains from policy 
intervention are negligible in aquifer management, when compared with non-regulation 
or “free market” outcomes. This is the so-called Gisser-Sánchez effect (GSE), which 
has been supported by the ensuing literature during recent decades. The GSE requires a 
number of assumptions, among which is the disregard for aquatic ecosystems linked and 
dependent on aquifer systems. The depletion of aquifer systems in arid and semiarid 
regions worldwide is causing acute water scarcity and quality degradation, and leading 
to extensive ecosystem damages. This study shows that by including environmental 
damages into the analytical model, results can change substantially. The analysis 
highlights both theoretically and empirically the importance of policies in groundwater 
management, as well as the potential role for stakeholders’ cooperation. The empirical 
application deals with two large aquifers in Spain, the Western La Mancha aquifer 
which is grossly mismanaged, and the Eastern La Mancha aquifer, which is moving 
towards sustainable management. Western and Eastern La Mancha aquifers illustrate 
that policies and institutions are essential to avoid the current global aquifer 
mismanagement.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The pressure on water resources has been mounting worldwide during the last 
century, creating problems in basins of rich and poor countries alike. This pressure is 
linked to the ever-increasing growth in population and economic activities at global 
scale. Although water integrity is an essential condition for having living rivers with 
healthy aquatic ecosystems, the pressure on water quantity and quality has been 
growing rapidly. The current situation is that water degradation is pervasive in many 
basins around the world, driven by the impacts of the escalating anthropogenic 
activities. 
The problems created by the growing pressure of water extractions are twofold: one 
is water scarcity in local watersheds or whole basins created by excessive surface and 
groundwater withdrawals. The other is water degradation from pollution loads leading 
to many tracts of rivers and whole aquifers being spoiled, and losing their capacity to 
sustain ecosystem functioning and human activities. 
In recent decades, water scarcity has become widespread in most arid and semiarid 
regions around the world, including river basins such as the Ganges, Indus, Yellow, 
Yangtze, Tigris, Euphrates, Nile, Amu and Syr Daria, Murray-Darling, Colorado and 
Rio Grande. Surface and subsurface resources in these river basins are being depleted 
and their quality degraded (World Water Assessment Programme, 2006). The scarcity 
problems in basins of arid and semiarid regions were created at first by extractions of 
surface waters, but at present they are compounded by the huge development of 
groundwater by individual wells, brought about by the adoption of pumping 
technologies with falling costs worldwide. 
The region of the Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra is the largest irrigated area in the 
world, expanding over 2.7 million ha in northern India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal 
and Eastern Afghanistan (Siebert et al., 2007). Groundwater overdraft in the region has 
been estimated at around 50 km3 per year from satellite data (Tiwari et al., 2009). The 
problems created by this huge depletion of aquifers result from the declining water 
tables, and from the degradation of water quality by pollution loads or saline intrusion 
in coastal aquifers. One important health problem is the arsenic pollution detected in 
Bangladesh, which is poisoning the impoverished population in that country. 
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The Ogallala aquifer in the North American high plains covers 450,000 km2 and 
supplies water to irrigate 5 million ha of land. Withdrawals for irrigation are 26 km3 per 
year, which include an overdraft of around 10 km3. The current storage amounts to 
3,610 km3 and the accumulated depletion is estimated at 310 km3, with a water table 
decline that could attain up to 30 meters (McGuire, 2007). The only measure taken so 
far by federal, state and local public agencies is the monitoring of water level changes, 
but no control measures have been taken yet to stabilize or reduce overdraft. 
Groundwater depletion in the Indus-Ganges basins and the Ogallala aquifer, 
together with groundwater depletion in places such as the Northern China plain 
Southwestern United States, Australia, Spain and Mexico, demonstrate that aquifer 
mismanagement is the rule, and that sustainable management of groundwater is a 
complex task that is very difficult to achieve. The reason behind the pervasive aquifer 
mismanagement worldwide is that groundwater is a common pool resource with 
environmental externalities. Adequate management can only be brought about by 
cooperation of stakeholders through the right institutional setting, rather than using pure 
economic instruments that are harder to implement in the case of public goods (Albiac, 
2009). 
The theory of depletable resources such as groundwater is an important field in 
economic theory, encompassing a large range of analytical results with major 
contributions on the sustainability of resources exploitation by Solow (1974), Dasgupta 
and Heal (1974), Stiglitz (1974), Hartwick (1977), and Common and Perrings (1992).2 
The problem of depletable resources arises because of the difficulties in establishing 
property rights in resources, leading to excessive resource depletion. The common pool 
nature of groundwater means that the open access by competing users creates the water 
extraction externality. Extractions by one user reduce the water stock available to 
others, and because every user believes that competitors will not conserve water for 
future use, there is no incentive to protect the water stock. This is the reason for market 
failure and the need for appropriate institutional arrangements to correct the failure. 
Therefore, the key issue in depletable resources is whether or not markets are capable of 
achieving a balanced intertemporal allocation of resources (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979).   
The analysis presented here is based on the social welfare achieved under alternative 
aquifer management regimes. Social welfare is the difference between benefits and 
                                                            
2 The arguments revolve around the degree of substitution between man-made capital and natural capital, 
with additional questions such as technical progress, backstop technologies, and uncertainty. 
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costs to society pertaining to the alternative patterns of resource use through time. 
Social benefits are the private profits of users, and social costs include both economic 
and environmental negative externalities. The procedure is to optimize social welfare in 
a model that includes all these externalities, and compare it with the solution under 
myopic individual pumping by users that disregard all externalities. A large difference 
calls for public intervention through policy measures (Howe, 2002). The externalities 
appearing when aquifers are exploited are 1) the extraction cost externality, which arises 
because users affect each other by lowering the water table and increasing the costs of 
extractions; and 2) the environmental externality, which arises because the depletion of 
large aquifer systems imposes environmental damages over linked ecosystems. 
The contribution of this study is to take ecosystem damages into consideration in 
modeling aquifer management regimes. In the context of the intensive pressures on 
water resources described above, agents extract more water from aquifers than actual 
recharge, depleting the water storage and damaging the associated ecosystems. Decline 
in water tables cause progressive scarcity and quality degradation, and may lead to 
extensive loss of ecosystems. 
Gisser and Sánchez (1980a, 1980b) analyzed aquifer management regimes and 
found that welfare gains from policy intervention are insignificant when compared with 
non-regulation or competitive outcomes. This study shows that by including 
environmental externalities into the analytical framework, together with the extraction 
cost externality, results can change substantially. The main analytical finding is that 
policies to control groundwater management are preferred to “free market” or non- 
regulation outcomes, provided that ecosystem damages are not neglected when relevant. 
This finding is further examined with an empirical application to two large aquifers 
in Southern Spain, the Eastern and Western La Mancha aquifers, and the empirical 
results show large gains in welfare when correcting the market failures. While the 
Eastern La Mancha aquifer is moving towards sustainable management, the Western La 
Mancha aquifer is grossly mismanaged. The fall in the water table of Western La 
Mancha aquifer has lead to extensive destruction of wetlands and severe degradation of 
associated ecosystems, in particular the “Tablas de Daimiel” wetland, a National Park 
protected by UNESCO that is the second important wetland in the Iberian Peninsula. 
Both the theoretical analysis and the empirical analysis highlight the importance of 
policies and regulations in groundwater management, as well as the crucial need for 
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institutional arrangements. Neither cooperation among stakeholders nor pure economic 
instruments will work without the appropriate institutional setting. 
The article begins by presenting in section two an extension of the previous 
modeling effort by Gisser and Sánchez. This extended model accounts not only for the 
extraction costs externality caused by aquifer depletion, but also for the ecosystem 
damages externality from depletion. The purpose is to challenge the Gisser and Sánchez 
results by demonstrating that, under regulation, social welfare improves substantially 
over free market outcomes when ecosystem damages from depletion are important. 
Section three describes the Western and Eastern La Mancha aquifers, and compares the 
current management in both aquifers with three alternative management regimes. The 
first regime is “free market” with myopic pumping by agents that disregard both the 
extraction costs externality and the environmental externality. The second regime is 
partial cooperation with agents accounting for only the extraction costs of aquifer 
depletion. The third regime is full cooperation with agents accounting for both the 
extraction costs and the environmental externalities. Finally, the summary and 
conclusions are presented in section four. 
 
2. Extending the Model of Gisser-Sánchez with Environmental Damages 
 
Gisser and Sánchez (1980a) state a straightforward model of groundwater to 
compare two management alternatives for water allocation in an aquifer: one is free 
market or “laissez-faire,” and the other is policy regulation or control. The analytical 
finding from their model is that the outcomes from free market or policy regimes are 
almost the same when aquifers are large enough. Gisser and Sánchez apply the model to 
the Pecos Basin of New Mexico, and the empirical results confirm the analytical 
findings. The conclusion is that policy regulation represented by the optimal control 
solution of groundwater management does not imply a perceptible increase in social 
welfare over free market. Therefore, any public intervention is not justified. 
This result is known as the “Gisser-Sánchez effect” (GSE), which has been mostly 
confirmed by the ensuing literature (Burness and Brill, 2001; Dixon, 1989; Feinerman 
and Knapp, 1983; Knapp and Olson, 1995; Nieswiadomy, 1985; Provencher, 1993; 
Provencher and Burt, 1994). Koundouri (2004a, 2004b) summarizes this literature 
indicating that the GSE holds in most cases, although it is sensitive to the size of the 
aquifer and the specification of the water-demand function, which drives benefits. The 
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validity of the GSE rests on the key assumption that the aquifer has to be quite large, 
and the secondary assumption of a small slope in the water-demand function. 
A separate strand of the literature deals with groundwater quality, with contributions 
by Hellegers et al. (2001), Roseta-Palma (2002 and 2003), and Knapp and Baerenklau 
(2006). Hellegers et al. argue for water pricing to reduce groundwater pollution and to 
spur advanced irrigation technologies, and Roseta-Palma shows that open access is 
characterized by smaller storage, lower quality or both. However, these papers don’t 
discuss whether free markets are good enough or if aquifers need policy intervention. 
Knapp and Baerenklau address the issue of welfare gains from policy regulation, and 
suggest greater efforts to manage groundwater than recommended from previous 
literature.  
Gisser and Sánchez devise a dynamic model linking economic, hydrologic and 
agronomic variables of groundwater use. First, the demand and supply functions for 
irrigated water are defined, and these functions are connected with the hydrological 
characteristics of the aquifer. Then, the path of water allocation through time is 
calculated under the policy regime and the free-market regime, and results are tested 
empirically in the Pecos River Basin in New Mexico. 
The water demand function is , where  is water extraction,  is 
water price, and  and  are the intercept and the price coefficient. The water supply 
is the pumping marginal cost function , where  is water table level, 
and  and  are the intercept and the water table coefficient (This is a reformulation 
of , where  is the elevation of the irrigation surface). The 
hydrological behavior of the aquifer is represented by the differential equation 
 that explains the change in the water table , where  is 
natural recharge,  is the return flow coefficient,  is the area of the aquifer, and  is 
the storativity coefficient. 
Under free market, farmers equate the current value of the marginal physical 
product of water ( ) with the current marginal cost of pumping 
( ), without accounting for the water extraction cost externality. Using 
these two equations, together with the differential equation, the free-market solution for 
the water table  and the water extractions  are given by equations (1) and (2) in 
Table 1, where  is the initial level of the water table at . 
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Under policy regulation, Gisser and Sánchez take into account the extraction cost 
externality. They formulate the optimal control problem by maximizing social welfare, 
defined by the present value of their collective private profits through time. 
   
   ,                              
 
where  is farmers’ revenue (the integral of the price dependent water 
demand equation) and  is the social discount rate. The solution equations for the water 
table  and for the water extractions  are given by equations (4) and (5) in Table 1, 
where   . 
Gisser and Sánchez prove that the equations for the water table and for the water 
extractions are almost the same under free market and under policy regulation. They 
assume a very large aquifer with relatively large AS (area multiplied by storativity), and 
use this assumption to simplify the solution equations under policy regulation (4) and 
(5), until the resulting expressions equal the solution equations under free market (1) 
and (2).3  
The intuition behind this result is that the free-market solutions (1) and (2) do not 
take the future into account, while the social planner solutions (4) and (5) do, and the 
differences are explained by the stock effect and discounting. When the aquifer 
becomes bigger the future matters less, because the effects of dropping water tables are 
pushed into the future, which is highly discounted. This is the reason for the 
convergence between free-market and social-planner solutions for large aquifers.  
This result is the so-called Gisser-Sanchéz effect, or in the words of Gisser and 
Sánchez “…[regulation] of groundwater would not enhance the welfare of farmers 
compared with a strategy of free markets.” There are no reasons to believe that policies 
                                                            
3 See Gisser and Sánchez (1980a) and Esteban (2010) for details. 
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regulating large aquifers would achieve any welfare gains. Furthermore, policy 
implementation involves transaction costs that should be accounted for, and the 
transaction costs make the dismissal of any groundwater policies even stronger. 
The model of Gisser-Sánchez just described is now extended to include 
environmental damages. In the context of large-scale intensive pressures on water 
resources in arid and semiarid regions worldwide described in section 1, vast numbers 
of agents are extracting more water from aquifers than actual recharge, depleting the 
water storage and damaging the associated ecosystems. 
 
Table 1. Solution equations for the water table  and the water extractions  
Solutions under free market 
  
(1) 
                       
(2) 
Solutions under regulation with the extraction cost externality 
             (4) 
                   
(5) 
Solutions under regulation with the extraction cost and environmental externalities 
    (7)  
                       
(8) 
 
The analytical demonstration that policies and social interventions for sustainable 
aquifer management could make sense is based on an enlarged model that includes 
damages to ecosystems dependent on the aquifer. These environmental damages are 
social costs but they are external to markets and, thus, they are not taken into account by 
farmers in their decisions on water extractions. The extended model is an optimal 
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control problem that includes the two types of externalities that appear in exploiting 
aquifers: the water extraction cost and the environmental externalities. 
The ecosystem damages from groundwater depletion in large aquifer systems are 
driven by complex underlying biophysical processes that include nonlinear, dynamic, 
spatial and threshold features. The specification of the damage cost function can be 
difficult because of the lack of knowledge and data collection on these processes.  
Another problem is that ecosystems may undergo abrupt shifts between alternative 
states, called “regime shifts” (Scheffer et al., 2001). Ecosystems may respond smoothly 
to gradual changes in groundwater depletion, but responses can be strong beyond 
certain thresholds, leading to dramatic transitions or even to the collapse of linked 
ecosystems. In such cases, the restoration of the previous groundwater stock is not 
sufficient for the recovery of the previous state of ecosystems (hysteresis). Given the 
limited knowledge and information available on ecosystem damages from depletion in 
large-scale aquifer systems, simplifying assumptions seem reasonable, and the damage 
cost function has been specified as linear in the volume of depletion. 
Social welfare is defined by the farmers’ revenue minus the cost of water extractions 
and the cost of ecosystem damages (Esteban and Albiac, 2010a). The formulation of the 
optimal control problem is given by: 
  
    ,                             
 
where farmers’ revenue is  , the cost of pumping is , and 
the new component is , the cost of environmental damages. This 
environmental cost is defined as the volume depleted from the aquifer in each period 
 multiplied by parameter . Aquifer depletion is the difference 
between net extractions  and recharge . Parameter  is the cost of 
damages to ecosystems from each cubic meter of aquifer depletion.  
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Solving the optimal control problem, the solution equations for the water table and 
the water extractions are given by equations (7) and (8) in Table 1. These solution 
equations under policy regulation (7) and (8) are different from those of Gisser and 
Sánchez (4) and (5), because of the additional terms involving the ecosystem damages 
of parameter . Equations (7) and (8) prove analytically that the introduction of 
ecosystem damages results in a different behavior of the aquifer under free-market and 
policy regimes, with quite different social welfare outcomes.4 
This result is no surprise because if extractions are penalized for some other reason 
than the extraction cost externality, namely ecosystem damages, then extractions are 
further reduced. For large aquifer systems supporting important environmental assets, 
there are two countervailing effects on welfare. One is the extraction cost externality, 
with welfare effects from depletion pushed into the future and being heavily discounted 
for large aquifers, making the Gisser-Sánchez effect possible. The other is the 
environmental externality that increases the welfare difference between policy and free- 
market regimes all along the planning period. Therefore, the validity of the Gisser-
Sánchez effect is largely an empirical question, which is examined in the following 
section.    
 
3. Empirical Application to the Western and Eastern La Mancha Aquifers 
 
The Western and the Eastern La Mancha aquifers and the adjacent wetlands are 
located in Castilla-La Mancha, in Southern Spain. The development of intensive use of 
groundwater for agriculture in recent decades has caused significant damages to aquatic 
ecosystems and also to human uses downstream because of aquifers depletion and 
reduction of river flows in La Mancha. Eighty kilometers of the Upper Guadiana River 
have disappeared, together with important associated wetland systems supporting very 
rich aquatic ecosystems and migrant waterfowl.  
These two large aquifers are contrasting examples of management regimes. The 
interest in the case stems from the fact that the Eastern La Mancha aquifer is unique in 
that it is a large aquifer being managed towards sustainability, due to the success of the 
                                                            
4 The reason is that equations (7) and (8) of the policy regulation regime cannot be simplified to equations 
(1) and (2) of the free-market regime even when AS is large, because equations (7) and (8) have 
additional  terms in the right hand side of  and . In ,  appears in the first term and in 
the parenthesis, while in ,  appears in the parenthesis. Since these additional environmental terms 
 do not vanish, the equations are different from the free-market regime. 
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collective action engaged by stakeholders (Esteban and Albiac, 2010b). In stark 
contrast, its neighboring Western La Mancha aquifer is being grossly mismanaged. 
The expansion of irrigation in the Eastern La Mancha aquifer during recent decades 
caused a substantial decline in the aquifer’s water table. The institutional developments 
started when farmers became aware of the problems from aquifer depletion and 
responded by creating the water-user association in 1995, aimed to jointly manage the 
aquifer. The process began because the town of Albacete wanted a concession of water 
for urban use from the basin authority, and the basin authority with the support of the 
downstream stakeholders in Valencia State, called for the control of extractions and 
threatened farmers by not issuing water rights. Other reasons that facilitated active 
support from farmers were the increase in pumping costs because of the fall of the 
aquifer water table, and the relatively small number of farmers involved. 
The key for this system to work is that farmers themselves are involved in the 
process of enforcement and control. The efforts of the water-user association, together 
with the support of the basins authority and the state government, have resulted in a 
reduction in extractions during the 2000s.                  
The accumulated depletion in the Western La Mancha aquifer was already 1.50 km3 
in 1987, and the response by the basin authority to this rapid degradation was to declare 
the aquifer “officially” overdrafted, so that the construction of any new wells was 
forbidden. However, it took four years for the basin authority to design the management 
regime to curb extractions by a system of water quotas assignment. This management 
regime was completely ignored by farmers, and the basin authority was unable to 
enforce it, both because of lack of resources and lack of political will. A lobby to 
support illegal pumping was created by farmers’ unions, municipalities, water-user 
associations and members of the state government. 
Large amounts of money were spent in Western La Mancha during the 1990s to pay 
farmers in exchange for water extractions abatement, without any success (CES, 2006).5 
In 2005, the basin authority brought to court 5,000 illegal wells, but then the federal 
ministry of environment fired the president and the water commissioner of the basin 
authority, yielding to pressures from farmers and the state government. The current 
policy in the Western La Mancha aquifer is the Special Plan of the Upper Guadiana to 
                                                            
5 This is the “Wetlands Plan” of 1992-2002 financed with European Union funds, with payments 
amounting to 250 million Euros, while depletion increased from 1.80 to 3.10 km3 along with illegal 
pumping (Iglesias, 2002). 
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recover the aquifer, with huge investments of 5.5 billion Euros in buying water rights, 
afforestation, rural development, urban supply and wastewater treatment (CHGN, 
2008). But this seems to be a misguided policy to recover the aquifer, because 
stakeholders’ cooperation requires serious commitments to manage and care for the 
aquifer, and cannot be exclusively bribed for by side payments. 
Undoubtedly, it is better for aquifers if farmers cooperate than if they don’t. But 
how exactly cooperation can be brought about in either normal or difficult 
circumstances is a tough question. There are no easy recipes, as shown by the pervasive 
mismanagement of aquifer systems in arid and semiarid regions around the world. In 
the La Mancha case, several factors contributed to the emergence of cooperation in 
Eastern La Mancha. One was the significant increase in pumping costs due to the 
alarming fall in the water table of up to 80 meters in some locations (Sanz et al., 2009). 
Another factor was the credible threat of forbidding extractions, which came from the 
Jucar basin authority, with the full support of downstream Jucar users with historical 
water rights that date back centuries. Also, the number of farmers was only 1,000, much 
smaller than the number of farmers (around 70,000) in Western La Mancha (Esteban 
and Albiac, 2010b).   
The extended model is applied to the Eastern and Western La Mancha aquifers. The 
purpose is to confirm empirically the analytical finding of the previous section, namely 
that regulation policies can improve substantially the management of aquifers. The 
procedure followed is to compare the current management of the Eastern and Western  
 
Table 2. Parameters of the Western and Eastern La Mancha aquifers 
Parameter Western La Mancha  
Eastern 
La Mancha  
Quasi-rent of cereals ( ) 628 (€/ha) 542 (€/ha) 
Quasi-rent of vegetables ( ) 3,500 (€/ha) 4,900 (€/ha) 
Quasi-rent of fruit-trees ( )  1,200 (€/ha) 1,280 (€/ha) 
Water use by cereals ( ) 4,340 (m3/ha) 5,860 (m3/ha) 
Water use by vegetables ( ) 4,020 (m3/ha) 4,920 (m3/ha) 
Water use by fruit trees ( ) 3,150 (m3/ha) 3,150 (m3/ha) 
Pumping cost intercept ( ) 0.08-0.11 (€/m
3·ha) 0.06-0.11 (€/m3·ha) 
Pumping cost coefficient ( ) 0.0004 (€/m·m3·ha) 0.0004 (€/m·m3·ha) 
Return flow coefficient ( ) 0.2 0.2 
Social discount rate ( ) 0.05 0.05 
Water table current elevation ( ) 640 (m.a.s.l.) 660 (m.a.s.l.) 
Recharge (w/o return flows, ) 0.36 (km3) 0.25 (km3) 
Area of the aquifer (A) 5,500 (km2) 7,260 (km2) 
Storativity coefficient (S) 0.023 0.034 
Elevation of the aquifer surface ( ) 665 (m.a.s.l.) 690 (m.a.s.l.) 
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Environmental damage of depletion ( ) 0.05 (€/m3) 0.05 (€/m3) 
 Source: Esteban and Albiac (2010b). The reference year for the parameter values is 2007. 
 
La Mancha aquifers, with three alternative management regimes. These three regimes 
are free-market, partial-cooperation and full-cooperation regimes. 
The free-market or no-cooperation regime is characterized by myopic pumping by 
agents that disregard the extraction cost and the environmental externalities, leading to 
depletion of the aquifer. The second regime is partial cooperation by agents that account 
only for the extraction cost externality. The third regime is full cooperation by agents 
that account for both the extraction cost and the environmental externality. 
Myopic pumping is characterized by agents that maximize just the current period 
private profits, without considering externalities. When agents account for the extraction 
cost externality, they maximize the value of their future stream of collective private 
profits. Finally, when agents account for both externalities, they maximize social 
welfare, because both the value of collective private profits and the environmental 
damages are internalized in their extraction decisions. 
The classification of the current aquifer management in one of the three regimes is 
done by comparing the pattern through time of the variables water table level and water 
extractions. The assumption is that the current management in La Mancha aquifers is a 
consequence of the choice made by agents on the type of regime, from no cooperation 
in dealing with any externality to full cooperation to internalize both externalities. 
There are three farming production activities in the model: cereals, vegetables and 
fruit trees. These crop activities are irrigated and require a fixed amount of water, and 
therefore the water extractions from the aquifer are driven by the irrigated acreage. The  
Table 3. Results of management regimes in the Western La Mancha aquifer 
 Initial Period 
No Cooperation 
or Free Market 
Partial 
Cooperation 
Full 
Cooperation 
  
Collapse in year 12 Extraction cost 
externality 
Extraction cost & 
environmental 
externalities 
Water table (m.a.s.l.) 
  (natural level=665) 640 608 649 661 
Gross extractions (km3) 0.59 1.00 0.44 0.44 
Water stock (km3) 
(natural stock=6.50) 3.50 0 4.50 6.00 
Acreage (ha) 191,400 253,400 120,700 120,700 
Time to stationary (years) - 12 13 19 
Welfare (M€, 30 y. period) - 430 1500 1790 
Source: Esteban and Albiac (2010b). 
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hydrologic and economic parameters used to run the model simulations are shown in 
Table 2.6 The information to build the model includes crop acreage by municipal district 
(Gobierno de Castilla-La Mancha, 2008), costs and revenues by crop in the region 
(MARM, 2008) and biophysical information (Martínez-Santos et al., 2008; Sanz et al., 
2009). The cost of damages to ecosystems from each cubic meter of aquifer depletion 
(parameter ) has been estimated based on the contingent valuation study by Júdez et 
al. (2000, 2002).7 The GAMS package has been used for data management and scenario 
simulation. 
  
3.1. Results from the management regimes 
The results from the management regimes in the Western and Eastern La Mancha 
aquifers are presented in Tables 3 and 4. The free-market regime in Western La Mancha 
expands acreage while social welfare is plummeting, with gross extractions growing 
from 0.59 km3 to 1.00 km3. Current welfare falls by three quarters, and finally irrigation  
Table 4. Results of management regimes in the Eastern La Mancha aquifer 
 Initial Period 
No Cooperation 
or Free Market 
Partial 
Cooperation 
Full 
Cooperation 
   
Extraction cost 
externality 
Extraction cost & 
environmental 
externalities 
Water table (m.a.s.l.) 
 (natural level=690) 660 627 679 689 
Gross extractions (km3) 0.42 0.31 0.31 0.31 
Water stock (km3) 
(natural stock=10.00) 7.00 3.90 9.00 9.80 
Acreage (ha) 90,300 73,500 59,100 59,100 
Time to stationary (years) - 14 17 22 
Welfare (M€, 30 y. period) - 810 1150 1280 
                                                            
6 The variables and parameters of the empirical model are slightly different from the analytical model. For 
example, the water input demand is not continuous but formed by three rectangles corresponding to the 
(shadow) water prices and water used by vegetables, fruit-trees and cereals. For each of these crops, net 
income is equal to net income per cubic meter ( ) multiplied by the water used in producing the crop 
( ). The water used in producing the crop ( ) is equal to crop acreage ( ) multiplied by the crop 
water requirement per hectare ( ), so net income of a crop is equal to . Defining the crop net 
income per hectare , as the net income per cubic meter multiplied by the crop water requirement, or 
, the net income of a crop is then , and total net income from the three crops is given 
by . Detailed information on the empirical model specification, 
variables and parameters can be found in Esteban and Albiac (2010b). 
7 Parameter β is only an approximation to ecosystem damages, because the information on ecosystem 
damages from depletion is quite limited. The value of β has been calculated as the value of ecosystems 
supported by the aquifer (based on the contingent valuation study), divided by the water storage of the 
aquifer. Since this is a crude approximation to ecosystem damages, a sensitivity analysis has been 
performed for different values of parameter β, the cost of damages to ecosystems. Aquifer depletion is 
inversely related with damages; it is lower when damages are high (large β) and higher when damages are 
low (small β). See details on the sensitivity analysis in Esteban and Albiac (2010b).  
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Source: Esteban and Albiac (2010b). 
 
collapses because depletion above 6.00 km3 prevents any further extractions. The 
collapse of the aquifer would be tied to important quality problems in the remaining 
stock of water, which hamper the subsequent gradual recuperation of the aquifer.  
The free-market regime in Eastern La Mancha expands also current acreage with a 
massive depletion of 6.30 km3, and current welfare is reduced by half. Rising pumping 
costs will reduce irrigation, and thus aquifer storage recovers somewhat. The Eastern La 
Mancha aquifer does not collapse under the peak depletion of 6.30 km3 because storage 
is above 10.00 km3, much larger than the Western La Mancha storage. 
Partial cooperation brings down extractions in both Western and Eastern aquifers, 
with a recovery of storage above 1.00 km3. However, the rise in the water table is not 
enough to recover all the “tablas” systems and 80 kilometers of the dried-up Guadiana 
River. Full cooperation is needed for recovery of both aquifers, requiring that farmers 
incorporate not only the extraction cost externality, but also the environmental 
externality. Under full cooperation, farmers curb extractions by more than half during 
several years in both aquifers, yielding a relatively rapid recovery of the water table and 
the highest social welfare (Figure 1). 
The present value of welfare for a planning period of thirty years shows large 
differences between free market and cooperation, either partial or full (Tables 3 and 4). 
In Western La Mancha welfare gains are very large, from 430 million Euros under free 
market up to 1,500 and 1,790 million Euros under partial and full cooperation, 
respectively. In Eastern La Mancha welfare gains are also substantial, from 810 million 
Euros under free market up to 1,150 and 1,280 million Euros under partial and full 
cooperation, respectively. These empirical results show that the difference between free  
 
Figure 1. Aquifers depletion under free market, partial and full cooperation (km3) 
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Source: Esteban and Albiac (2010b). 
 
market and partial cooperation is very significant, so that the GSE would not hold even 
before environmental externalities are taken into account by full cooperation.  
 
3.2. Comparison with the current management 
The comparison between the simulations of the three management regimes and the 
current management indicates the degree of competition or cooperation among farmers 
in each aquifer. The accumulated depletion in both aquifers is nearly 3.00 km3 and has 
followed a similar pattern between 1980 and 2000; however, during the last decade the 
data show success in the efforts made in Eastern La Mancha to curb extractions and 
eliminate overdraft (Table 5). The overdraft in Eastern La Mancha at the end of the 
1990s was 0.10 Mm3 per year, resulting from annual extractions around 0.43 km3 and 
recharges of 0.33 km3. After establishment of formal cooperation in Eastern La Mancha 
starting in 2000, annual extractions have been falling steadily during the following 
decade from 0.40 km3 down to 0.30 km3 in recent years, with the average of 0.35 km3 
being quite close to the safe recharge. The depletion trend of 0.10 km3 per year of  
Table 5. Extractions in Eastern and Western La Mancha during the last decade 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Extractions, Eastern 
La Mancha (km3) 0.42 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.35 0.29 0.27 0.30 
Extractions, Western 
La Mancha (km3) 0.59 0.61 0.68 0.65 0.62 0.43 0.67 0.61 0.44 0.49 
Source: Sanz el al. (2009), IGME (2009) and CHJ (2009). 
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previous decades has fallen to 0.03 Mm3 per year during the last decade. This 
achievement derives from the collective action of farmers.8 
The overdraft in Western La Mancha at the end of the 1990s was 0.11 km3, resulting 
from extractions around 0.58 km3 and recharges around 0.47 Mm3. But this overdraft 
has been unabated in Western La Mancha during the last decade, as the evidence from 
Table 5 shows. All extractions are above recharge except for two years, and the average 
extractions during the decade are 0.58 km3, well above recharge. 
The current regime in Western La Mancha aquifer is far from any cooperation, 
partial or full, and the aquifer is being largely overdrafted. The current management in 
Western La Mancha is certainly free market, and the case is troubling because there is 
no sign indicating that farmers are willing to cooperate. The huge multibillion 
investments of the Special Plan of the Upper Guadiana (CHGN, 2008) are unlikely to 
induce cooperation. Curbing the water extractions in Western La Mancha is quite a 
challenge at present because of the past history of policy mistakes and stakeholders 
opposition. In any case, failure to implement the right policy measures would lead to the 
collapse of the aquifer, with large economic and environmental losses. 
The current regime in Eastern La Mancha is moving towards partial cooperation, a 
change from free market that has taken place during last decade. Cooperation in Eastern 
La Mancha started in the middle of the 1990s and, since then, the water table level has 
stabilized because farmers have managed to reduce extractions in the last ten years. 
Although water extractions have fallen below the sustainable aquifer recharge (0.31 
km3) by the end of the 2000s, the recovery of the aquifer calls for larger reductions in 
extraction, down to 0.20 or even 0.10 km3 before returning to the 0.31 km3 level of 
sustainable recharge. 
These empirical results show that farmers in Eastern La Mancha are moving 
towards internalizing the extractions costs but not the environmental costs. Therefore, 
further advances in cooperation or other alternative policy instruments are needed to 
curb extractions and recover the aquifer. A steep decline in initial extractions to 
accommodate environmental damages would be met by farmers’ opposition, because 
their benefits would be reduced and not increased, as in the case of the extraction cost 
externality. Environmental externalities will either be internalized through the 
involvement of other stakeholders, even those farther from the aquifers, or will require 
                                                            
8 Farmers have changed their cropping patterns by planting less water-demanding crops, switching from 
summer to winter crops, and planting only one crop per year instead of two crops. 
18 
 
additional policy interventions by the basin authority. Interventions could include 
extraction restrictions or economic instruments under the appropriate institutional 
setting to make them legitimate. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The mismanagement of groundwater resources is an important policy issue 
worldwide. In arid and semiarid regions around the world, there has been a huge 
increase in extractions from groundwater systems in recent decades. These pressures are 
generating important problems of scarcity and water-quality degradation in most basins 
of these regions. Aquifer depletion is a relevant policy issue not only because of the 
exhaustion of these water bodies for human uses, but also because of the important 
damages sustained by connected ecosystems.  
Groundwater is a common pool resource characterized by rivalry in consumption 
and non-exclusion. Myopic individual pumping by agents disregards the extraction cost 
and environmental externalities, leading to excessive depletion of the aquifer and the 
degradation of linked ecosystems. In previous literature, the usual market failure that 
has been considered in aquifer management is the water extraction cost externality. This 
externality arises because extractions by each farmer reduce the aquifer stock and 
increase the pumping costs for all farmers and subsequent periods. But another 
important market failure is the damage produced by the fall in the water table on the 
ecosystems dependent on the aquifer. The theoretical and empirical analysis presented 
here indicates that environmental externalities may play an important role in the design 
of policies and regulations in the management of large aquifer systems.  
Gisser and Sánchez recognized the market failure of the extraction cost externality, 
and proposed a theoretical model to analyze free-market and policy intervention. Under 
free market, farmers equate individual marginal costs of pumping with the marginal 
value of the physical product. Farmers know that there are economic and environmental 
externalities involved but, since the aquifer is a common pool resource, their rational 
response is a myopic management behavior, leading to the degradation and eventual 
destruction of aquifer systems. Therefore, without any policy regulation, farmers do not 
internalize the extraction costs and environmental externalities, causing the ensuing 
market failure. A suitable policy intervention should induce some form of cooperation 
or support by farmers in order to achieve any welfare gains. 
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Gisser and Sánchez compare social welfare under free-market and policy 
regulations. Their finding is the so-called Gisser-Sánchez effect; the enhancement of 
social welfare from regulation does not justify any policy action to correct the market 
failure. We postulate that even when considering large aquifer systems, which is the 
main assumption for the GSE to hold, the ecosystem damages from depletion cannot be 
ignored. If they are important, the correction of the market failure increases social 
welfare, and this welfare difference between free-market and policy regimes is driven 
by the size of the ecosystem damages. 
For large aquifer systems in arid and semiarid regions worldwide, the vast aquifer 
depletion during recent decades is causing severe environmental damages. Therefore, 
our theoretical finding seems relevant and calls for a re-evaluation of current 
groundwater exploitation worldwide, in order to design workable policies for protecting 
human activities and ecosystems that depend on healthy aquifer systems. 
The empirical analysis focuses on two large aquifers in Spain: the Western and 
Eastern La Mancha aquifers. These aquifers are located in the Southern Iberian 
Peninsula, an area experiencing in recent decades strong pressures from the 
development of irrigation agriculture. An important empirical result is that both the 
extraction cost and the environmental externalities have sizable welfare effects. In 
particular, the extraction cost externality involves the main welfare effect in the two 
aquifers, contradicting the Gisser-Sánchez effect. 
The empirical findings show that the current management regime in Western La 
Mancha is close to free market, and the aquifer may collapse in the coming decades. 
The current management in the Eastern La Mancha aquifer is advancing from free 
market towards full cooperation. Farmers started worrying about collective management 
in the middle 1990s, and by the year 2000 formal cooperation among farmers was up 
and running. Since then, extractions have been falling significantly from 0.40 to 0.30 
km3 and are now below recharge. We think that this is an important accomplishment, 
which may be relevant for other large aquifers worldwide. Eventually, some lessons 
learned from this experience could contribute to the improvement of the pervasive 
mismanagement of aquifer systems across the globe. 
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